Online Responsibility: Bad Samaritanism and the Influence of Internet Mediation by Polder-Verkiel, Saskia E.
Online Responsibility: Bad Samaritanism
and the Inﬂuence of Internet Mediation
Saskia E. Polder-Verkiel
Received: 19 July 2010/Accepted: 8 December 2010/Published online: 16 December 2010
  The Author(s) 2010. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract In 2008 a young man committed suicide while his webcam was running.
1,500 people apparently watched as the young man lay dying: when people ﬁnally
made an effort to call the police, it was too late. This closely resembles the case of
Kitty Genovese in 1964, where 39 neighbours supposedly watched an attacker
assault and did not call until it was too late. This paper examines the role of internet
mediation in cases where people may or may not have been good Samaritans and
what their responsibilities were. The method is an intuitive one: intuitions on the
various potentially morally relevant differences when it comes to responsibility
between ofﬂine and online situations are examined. The number of onlookers, their
physical nearness and their anonymity have no moral relevance when it comes to
holding them responsible. Their perceived reality of the situation and ability to act
do have an effect on whether we can hold people responsible, but this doesn’t seem
to be unique to internet mediation. However the way in which those factors are
intrinsically connected to internet mediation does seem to have a diminishing effect
on responsibility in online situations.
Keywords Responsibility  Internet mediation  Bad Samaritanism  Kitty
Genovese  Abraham Biggs  Bystander effect  Physical distance  Anonymity 
Ability to act  Perceived reality  Moral philosophy  Intuitions
Introduction
On November 19, 2008 a 19 year old boy from Florida, Abraham Biggs, committed
suicide in front of his webcam by taking an overdose of prescription medication.
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DOI 10.1007/s11948-010-9253-zThe webcam kept running while he lay on his bed, dying. He had alerted people on a
forum he frequented of his intentions, and had posted a link to where the webcam
could be viewed.
There was signiﬁcant online discussion, both on the forum and in the live chat
feature with the webcam feed. There was a lot of joking about the situation and
there were also people who egged him on. After a long time, people began to worry
as they noticed he no longer seemed to be moving. Eventually, a forum member
from India managed to alert the police, and not long after that the police ofﬁcers
could be seen storming into the room. By then Abraham had been dead for many
hours.
The incident aroused public outrage. Apparently 1,500 people had been watching
that webcam at some point, and part of the outrage was that none of them interfered
until it was too late.
1 The media presented the case of Abraham Biggs as a modern
version of the case of Kitty Genovese, whose fatal stabbing in 1964 was passively
observed by many witnesses thus arousing great public revulsion.
Kitty’s death prompted several states of the United States to create legislation for
what is dubbed bad samaritanism (cf. Feinberg 1984; McIntyre 1994): the failure to
aid in an emergency situation can, in some cases, render people legally liable. We
hold bad Samaritans responsible because they should have taken action and they are
blameworthy for not having done so. It is the responsibility of the onlookers that I
will focus on in this paper.
Is the Abraham Biggs case indeed a contemporary version of Kitty Genovese’s
case? Apart from some obvious differences between the ways in which these two
tragic deaths took place, what makes Biggs’ case seem special is the role played by
the internet. This paper will investigate the moral signiﬁcance of internet as a
mediator of events and whether it diminishes or adds to our responsibility for them.
One’s intuitions go both ways: on the one hand, it would have been very easy for the
average onlooker to call the police; suggesting surely they were responsible. On the
other hand, can we really assign responsibility to a person in India for preventing the
suicide of someone living in Florida, US?
Online experiences are often contrasted with ‘‘real life’’ experiences. This
indicates that internet mediated interaction is apparently conceived as something
that is ‘‘not real’’.
2 Of course, when things are conceived of as ‘‘not real’’, then what
is morally permissible changes too. For instance, shooting down a digital villain in a
ﬁrst person shooter game is (arguably) morally no different from taking a pawn in a
game of chess. However, in reality the internet is becoming more and more a part of
our daily lives, not only of our private lives but of our professional lives as well. If it
is true that internet mediation has a negative effect on our responsibilities, in the
sense that it makes us less responsible, this might have consequences for legislation
as well. Furthermore, if it is clear why and how the internet has an effect on our
1 Understandably, there was also outrage about how he was egged on.
2 I will refer to online and ofﬂine in this paper to make the contrast between internet mediated
experiences and experiences ‘‘in the ﬂesh’’ rather than to contrast between online and ‘‘real life’’ because
I do not believe that online situations are in any aspect less real.
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take responsibility online in the same way we can take responsibility ofﬂine.
3
The case of Abraham Biggs is the starting point from where I will make
comparisons with the case of Kitty Genovese and see if there are differences that are
possibly relevant for the degree to which an agent is morally responsible that are
speciﬁc to internet mediation. It is clear that there are some morally relevant
differences between the cases that are not due to internet mediation. For instance,
Abraham committed suicide and can arguably be said to have wanted to die,
whereas it is pretty certain that Kitty did not seek her own death. I will leave aside
the question of whether one has a duty to interfere with someone who wants to
commit suicide and instead I will assume for the sake of the argument that one does
have such a duty to intervene.
A very compelling method of constituting morally relevant differences is
provided by Peter Unger, who tweaks example cases in such a way that there is only
one variable that is different in each. He then tests intuitions about these cases
(Unger 1996). There are a number of difﬁculties with this approach (Philips 2007),
the ﬁrst of which is the difﬁculty of how to identify which factors are morally
relevant; second is the problem of then constructing cases in such a way that this
factor is the only difference between the cases; and third, ﬁguring out how to ensure
that the intuitions about those cases can be trusted, that is to say, that the constructed
cases are such that it is likely that one would have moral intuitions about them.
4
Unger, by using intuitions and showing how they can go awry, then argues against
the notion that intuitive responses to speciﬁc cases can determine what is right and
wrong in those cases. But as Singer (1999) points out, the claims about the
unreliability of intuitions is something that should be empirically investigated much
better before such strong conclusions can be drawn.
To help determine whether it is the internet that makes a morally relevant
difference, I will present a hypothetical contemporary Kitty Genovese case, where
the situation is placed in an internet mediated setting. After explaining how the
onlookers can be said to have been responsible, I will discuss the various candidate
factors for moral differences and compare the cases in that respect. Note that it is the
moral intuitions about the onlookers that I will compare and not the actual responses
of the onlookers. The method of comparison is an intuitive one. Although it would
have been ideal to construct a set of examples in the way that Peter Unger did in
order to probe our intuitions about whether online and ofﬂine situations make a
difference, it turned out that it is very difﬁcult to construct examples in such a way
that there is only one aspect differing between them. Instead I will work with the
examples that I have, accepting that there are multiple difference between the cases,
3 Provided we want us to be at least as responsible online as we are ofﬂine.
4 Philips mentions the highly hypothetical cases by Frances Kamm in this respect. Kamm (1999) has
constructed cases where people have exceptionally long distance vision and cases where machines that
will remotely lift drowning people from ponds if money is inserted in a device nearby the agent that will
activate the remote machine. It is indeed very difﬁcult to have trustworthy intuitions about such unusual
scenarios, because our everyday experience provides little guidance.
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give a comprehensive account of the case of Abraham Biggs: different intuitions
about both this case and the online situated Kitty case can help determine whether it
is indeed the internet mediation that is making the difference, rather than other
factors that are not exclusive to online situations. To the extent that moral
philosophy is dependent on empirical cases, it is important to have a precise
description of these empirical cases: if the description does not correspond with
what happened, the insights gained from it do not inform us about the reality of such
a situation. The cases will be presented next.
Abraham Biggs
In order to understand the circumstances on of Abraham Biggs’ death some
background information on some features of the internet is needed. I will provide
this information and then I will give an account of what happened on the night of his
demise. In doing so, I will probably provide more information than is strictly
necessary for my purposes, but to avoid misrepresenting the case as has happened
with the case of Kitty Genovese, I want to be as accurate as possible.
The Bodybuilding Forum
The forum Abraham Briggs subscribed to and announced his intentions on,
bodybuilding.com, is part of a commercial site which sells bodybuilding products
and also provides information about the subject. It is a widely popular site: they
currently claim to have approximately 250,000 unique visitors every day. The part
of the site that hosts the forum provides users with the opportunity to discuss issues
with other members. The forum can be read by everyone who visits the site, but in
order to respond to topics, one has to become a member. This is a simple process
that does not include any veriﬁcation of the identity of the user. People generally
enter a pseudonym with which they will be identiﬁed on the site. There are currently
over two million members of the forum. Those are not all active; that is, they do not
all post regularly (if at all). Those who are active make up the community of the
forum. The common language is English, but members come from wherever there is
internet access.
The forum is subdivided into categories that deal with bodybuilding issues.
People can reply to topics started by other people or start their own topics (which
are referred to as threads). In principle one can start any topic under any category,
but there are two mechanisms by which things are kept orderly: ﬁrst, there are
moderators, who have the ability to edit and delete posts. Moderators are
volunteers who have been granted these privileges by the administrator of the
forum. Second, the community will react negatively to posts that are put up in
inappropriate sections, which ensures people are careful about where they start
their topics.
Maintaining one’s ‘‘reputation’’ within the community is another important
aspect of the forum. Members of the forum can assign positive and negative
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posts, reputation points already owned, and years of membership. Having a certain
number of positive reputation points unlocks areas of the site that are not accessible
to those who don’t have enough reputation points (‘‘reps’’). The reputation point
system provides an incentive for members to post helpful posts, to avoid posting
comments that will get negative ‘‘reps’’ and to be proliﬁc in posting, which keeps
the forum alive.
Although forums are generally dedicated to a particular subject, there usually is a
section dedicated to off-topic discussion. The header for these discussions is
generally ‘‘Miscellaneous’’ which is often abbreviated to ‘‘misc’’. Often, the ‘‘misc’’
section is the one in which there is the most activity (i.e. posts). To illustrate, on the
bodybuilding forum, of the approximately 51 million posts that are currently posted,
close to 25 million posts are in the ‘‘misc’’ section under ‘‘more general categories’’.
The next most popular sections are ‘‘supplements’’ under ‘‘main forums’’ with
almost seven million posts and ‘‘teen bodybuilding’’ under ‘‘Speciﬁcally for you’’
with just over ﬁve million posts.
5
The discussion in the ‘‘misc’’ section can be about anything, and since members
feel a sense of community with other regularly posting members, private things
often get discussed here, with subjects varying from trouble with girlfriends
(although there are many female members, the majority of the participants are male
and estimated to be around 20), to school, parents, and other personal problems. The
‘‘misc’’ section is therefore also the section that attracts the most ‘‘trolls’’, as they
are called. Those are people who intentionally try to disrupt communities, mainly by
baiting and riling people. Posts about private matters make those members
vulnerable for ridicule, which is what trolls seek out. The tone of the discussion in
the ‘‘misc’’ section varies a lot, often with sympathetic and encouraging messages
from other members, but there are also often instances of ridiculing and taunting.
The general atmosphere seems to be one in which people are expected to know that
both kinds of responses are possible and they are expected to accept it.
Posts in forums remain there until removed, which generally does not happen.
Replies to a thread can be posted long after a thread is started (unless the thread has
been closed for comments). Although the postings on a ‘‘hot’’ topic can be very fast
and exceed a post a second, the medium is not really suited for fast communication,
mainly because the thread loses coherence with such postings: during the time
someone is typing a response in a thread, others have already responded, and it
becomes difﬁcult to follow. The medium is also unsuitable for live streaming of
webcam information. Not only does it require a different technology to post a live
webcast than a video ﬁle, the transient nature of webcasts does not ﬁt with the more
permanent nature of a forum post.
6
5 Information obtained from http://forum.bodybuilding.com in June 2010.
6 It is possible to embed the webcast URL if the forum interface allows for embedding, but there would
be an error message visible in the post when the webcast is terminated, because then the embedded object
no longer exists.
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There are various sites on the internet that enable people to broadcast live images
from a webcam (live webcasting) on the net. The site that Abraham used was
Justin.tv. With this site, one needs to register in order to be able to webcast from
one’s webcam. In order to view the webcam, however, no registration is necessary.
Amongst the information and facilities that the site offers to viewers are the webcam
feed, the number of viewers and the total number of views since the webcast started.
Next to the webcam images is a box where viewers can chat in real time. This
means that people can type messages in a box under the chat window, which will
then instantly appear in the chat window, along with the messages that other people
have typed. This is a more immediate form of communicating than typing messages
on a forum, and it is also more transient. Generally, the chat screen just shows a
maximum number of lines, and everything that was typed before becomes
inaccessible (except for the administrator of the site, and then only if the software is
set up to maintain archives). At the time Abraham Biggs webcast his suicide, it was
not necessary to register in order to be able to chat in the chat window, although it
was possible to register, in which case people’s chosen screen name would appear
before the line posted in the chat window.
Reconstruction of the Case
Having explained the nature of the media, I shall now proceed to reconstruct the
circumstances of Abraham Biggs’ death. This is somewhat difﬁcult for reasons that
will become apparent later.
Abraham Biggs was a 19 year old college student in Florida and he was an active
member in the ‘‘misc’’ section on the bodybuilding forum.
7 Abraham was diagnosed
with bipolar disorder and had posted about committing suicide before. For instance,
in December 2007 he started a thread about how he felt down about himself and
how he had attempted suicide before. The responses were not particularly nasty or
disparaging. On the whole, Abraham did pretty well with ‘‘reps’’: he got second
rank with the number of reputation points he obtained.
At 2:35 AM
8 on November 19, 2008, Abraham, who was known as
‘‘CandyJunkie’’ on the forum, started a new thread ‘‘I’m trippin on bars on my
webcam’’, where he posted a link to his webcam images on Justin.tv. He added a
message, saying ‘‘thoughts of suicide are there but no worrys I’m not gonna kill
myself’’. A few minutes later he speciﬁed that he had taken a ‘‘roxie’’ which is short
for the drug roxicodone, a narcotic pain reliever. At 2:55 AM he posted ‘‘[…] I’m
gonna take the last bar I have and a bunch of roxies, and some lexapro which I don’t
think will do anything, I’ll be dead within a few hours.’’ The substances Abraham
referred to are prescription medicines: ‘‘bar’’ is the urban term for Xanax tablets
(alprazolam), a benzodiazepine which is prescribed for anxiety disorders; Lexapro is
7 In the 2 years that he was a member, he posted well over 1,100 posts.
8 The forum time stamp is 1.35 AM, but the forum time was GMT -7; in November, the Miami time zone
in which Abraham was, is GMT -6.
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Inhibitor (SSRI) type of antidepressant. From later accounts on the forum, it appears
that in this thread a lot of goading took place, along with expressions of concern. It
seems that Abraham also posted a suicide note on the forum. There appear to be no
records of what happened exactly on camera at that moment, but presumably
Abraham took the pills and then lay down on his bed with his back to the camera.
Meanwhile, a lively discussion took place in the chat window beside the camera
image on Justin.tv, and from later accounts on the forum, the tone was rather
jocular. There was discussion about whether he took enough pills to kill himself,
and also whether something should be done, but the latter appeared to be less than
serious. From later threads on the forum, it appears that it was initially possible to
see Abraham breathing but that at a certain point, people were not sure whether he
was breathing anymore.
One 17 year old forum member from India—which has a time difference of
10.5 h from Florida in winter—came home late from work and caught up with what
had been going on in the ‘‘misc’’ and came across the threads about ‘‘CandyJunkie’’
and got alarmed. It is on the discussion in this thread on the forum after the events
and a blog post by ‘‘Bulker’’ that most of this reconstruction is based.
9 ‘‘Bulker’’
also clicked the link to Justin.tv and determined that what he saw was not fabricated
and realised that he couldn’t see Abraham breathing. He then ‘‘[…] scanned the
Internet and found out his name, number, where he lived (not exact address though)
and pics’’ (‘‘Bulker’’ 2008).
10 This information he posted on the forum, and half an
hour later he also supplied the telephone number of the Miami police. Since people
still insisted that Abraham was faking it, ‘‘Bulker’’ decided to take action himself.
First he sent an e-mail to the Miami police, but that e-mail bounced, so he stole his
father’s cell phone and called the Miami police. He spoke to four people, none of
whom grasped the gravity of the situation. They gave him a different phone number
to call, but then the international credit of his father’s mobile account ran out, so he
stole his mother’s cell phone and called that number, where he was informed that
three people had called about the issue in the meantime.
Fifteen minutes later, the Miami police arrived at Abraham’s room—at
approximately 3 PM in Florida and 1:30 AM in India. They ﬁrst threw an object
at the lifeless body and when Abraham’s body didn’t respond, they could be seen to
enter the room and move in front of the camera. They checked the body and turned
around and put something over the lens of the camera. It was then that people
chatting alongside the screen on Justin.tv realised this was serious and the ‘‘lolz’’
11
were replaced by dismay. What happened next is that the people on the forum who
had been egging Abraham on rapidly started to delete their posts. Justin.tv also
became aware of the matter and deleted both the images that were broadcast and the
9 The thread where Abraham posted his suicide announcement had been removed from the forum almost
straight away, and a lot of threads relating to this issue have been removed from the forum later. I saved
some of the latter when they were still there.
10 There is no information about how this was achieved and whether it involved illegal activity.
11 ‘‘Lol’’ is an abbreviation for ‘‘laughing out loud’’: an expression of mirth. It got pluralised with a z
instead of an s, which is trendy in some parts of the internet. Doing something ‘‘for the lolz’’ (or
sometimes ‘‘lulz’’) means doing something for fun.
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justiﬁcation that the video had violated their policies. Those two events have
hampered the reconstruction of what had actually happened.
The next day, brief accounts of the circumstances surrounding Abraham’s death
appeared in the media, and public outrage ensued, this reaction being similar to that
following the reporting of the circumstances of the death of Kitty Genovese, which I
will describe next.
Kitty Genovese
With over a thousand publications inspired by it, the case of Kitty Genovese has
become the showcase of social psychology when it comes to diffusion of
responsibility and bystander apathy. The case as it was originally presented inspires
disgust at the callousness and apathy of onlookers. In order to have a more accurate
comparison with the case of Abraham Biggs, I will set the case in an online
situation: the online case will be an intermediary between Kitty’s original case and
the case of Abraham. First I shall sketch the original case.
The Original Case
The murder of Kitty Genovese in the early hours of March 13, 1964 was described
in the New York Times 2 weeks after it happened (Gansberg 1964). ‘‘For more than
half an hour 38 respectable, law-abiding citizens in Queens watched a killer stalk
and stab a woman in three separate attacks in Kew Gardens’’, the article begins, and
it continues to depict the case. Kitty got home from her job as a bar manager at
approximately 3:20 AM. She parked her car and started to walk the 30 m towards
her apartment door, but then she saw a man coming towards her and she started to
move away. The man overtook her and stabbed her in the back twice at which Kitty
cried out that she had been stabbed. Several of the neighbours’ lights came on and
one opened his window and shouted at the attacker to ‘‘let the girl alone’’, at which
the attacker moved away. Kitty, badly wounded, was making her way to the back
entrance of her apartment building when the attacker came back and stabbed her
again, at which she cried out again. Lights came on from neighbouring windows and
a window was opened and the attacker got in his car and left at 3:35 AM. Kitty then
made it into the building and collapsed at the foot of the stairs. The attacker returned
and found her there and stabbed her again.
The police received a phone call from a neighbour at 3.50 AM and they arrived at
the scene in 2 min, but that was too late to save Kitty. It turned out that 39 people
had witnessed some part of the assault and only one of them took action by calling
the police, albeit too late.
People later said that they didn’t want to get involved or that they thought it was
just a lovers’ quarrel.
However, De May and Manning et al. point out that the account in the New York
Times is rather inaccurate and misleading (cf. De May 2004; Manning et al. 2007).
At most 12 of the witnesses looked out of their windows and saw something taking
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a bar nearby which often was the source of noisy brawls in the middle of the night, it
is not that surprising that people did not give it more attention. Furthermore, there
were not three but two attacks, one in front of the building and one at the back of the
building, the latter taking place inside and hence out of view.
Despite the above, for the sake of this paper I will make an online adaptation of
the case as it has been described in the New York Times and as it has been assumed
to be in countless publications.
Kitty on Webcam
Suppose that we place the case of Kitty Genovese on the internet, in such a way that
the only witnesses to the event are the people who happen to be watching the
webcam. There are many webcams that are aimed at a particular street or park
publicly viewed on websites, and it is not unthinkable that an attack like that on
Kitty Genovese could be thus witnessed. In order for the people witnessing the
attack to be the only ones to witness it, it is more feasible to let the attack take place
in a park, rather than in a street in a residential area (because then people might see
it from their window, as happened in the original case). So the case is as follows: on
a website there is a webcam view of a certain path in a speciﬁed park in New York
and it is approximately 3 AM in the morning. What can be seen is a man apparently
assaulting a woman with an object that looks like a knife. Something scares the
attacker away; this cannot be due to some response from webcam viewer, as it is a
one way view. The woman staggers on and a few minutes later the attacker returns.
Most street view web cams do not have a microphone, so sound is not conveyed.
For our hypothetical online case I suppose the sound is not so relevant, since
contrary to the ofﬂine situation, people would be clicking on a link to watch a site
on purpose, so their attention would not need to be drawn by sounds.
Contrary to broadcasts on Justin.tv, street view cameras generally do not have a
counter of concurrent onlookers. This will ﬁt in with our online situated Genovese
case, because in the original situation people would not have a clear idea of how
many people were witnessing the scene either, although they were probably aware
that some were, because one of them opened his window and yelled at the attacker.
In our hypothetical online case, the woman dies on the spot and one of the
onlookers does inform the police, but as with the original case, this is too late.
As with the original case, it later transpires that at the time of the crime, 39 online
viewers were watching the events take place.
Although I already pointed out some obvious differences from the original case,
there are two other differences that are worth noting. First, contrary to the original
case, the onlookers are not necessarily located near the scene of the crime. In fact,
they might not only be in different countries, but even in different time zones. This
has practical relevance in the sense that it might not be easy to ﬁnd the emergency
number of the police at the scene of the crime.
12 The second important difference is
12 To conﬁrm this, I tried to ﬁnd emergency numbers in various foreign countries using Google. What
Google comes up with, generally, is the three digit emergency number you can dial when you are in the
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be a crime taking place by simply taking snapshots of the screen. If people were
reluctant to call because they were not certain of what they saw was a crime and did
not want to raise a false alarm, this might lower the threshold for actually making
the call.
Now that the cases are spelled out, it is time to look at how the onlookers might
have been responsible for the untimely death of a fellow human being.
Responsibility of the Onlookers
In order to ﬁgure out whether the internet makes a difference when it comes to
responsibility, it is necessary to make at least a rudimentary sketch of how the
onlookers might be responsible and might be held responsible. This outline will
provide a useful basis for establishing which factors may make a morally relevant
difference in online situations compared to ofﬂine situations. There are many ways
in which people can be responsible and can be held responsible and part of the
reason for this plurality is that responsibility is a complex concept, or even a
complex of concepts (Vincent 2011).
The moral outrage after the murder on Kitty Genovese did not focus on the grisly
details of the stabbing, but on the fact that 38 people apparently sat and watched the
mortal stabbing for half an hour and did not take action. We feel that they ought to
have done something to intervene, ergo; we feel they had the duty to intervene and
thus they had the responsibility to intervene. This kind of responsibility can be
assigned by either looking back or looking forward. When we take stock of what has
happened after the fact, we can determine whether the subjects either directly
caused the harm or were involved in the harmful outcome. When looking forward
(that is, considering that the harm in progress is happening right now, rather than in
the past), people might be in a position where their role made them responsible for
taking action and they are likely liable for not doing what they ought to have done
(Vincent 2011).
Looking back on the cases of both Abraham and Kitty, the issue with the
onlookers is not that they directly caused the deaths of Abraham or Kitty, but that
they omitted doing things that could have prevented further harm and in that sense,
they contributed to the outcome of Abraham and Kitty dying.
Can we hold them responsible for that? Apart from having to have the capacity to
make decisions, the main condition under which a person can be held responsible is
that the person is free from coercion; in other words, that his action or disposition is
Footnote 12 continued
country, which does not work outside the country. It takes a few minutes ﬁguring out what number to call
from abroad, if that information can be found at all.
A second problem that gets overlooked is the problem of language. Although English seems to be the
lingua franca on the internet, this doesn’t imply that everyone speaks it. Particularly if the crime takes
place in a country where the native language is not English, this might present a very acute problem: it is
quite possible that the gravity of the situation can neither be explained nor understood due to the fact that
people do not understand each other’s language.
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have control over the situation (the control condition): the action or disposition must
originate from within the agent and he must be free either to undertake or not to
undertake the action or to have the disposition.
13 Obviously, not only must people
have the freedom to act, but they also must have the ability to act. Second, the
person must be aware of what he is doing or bringing about. This is often referred to
as the epistemic condition. It must be noted that an attempted rescue is only required
if the action does not pose unreasonable risk of harm to the agent: you are not
required to sacriﬁce your life for another.
14
Not only can people be held responsible for actions and dispositions, it is also
agreed that people can be held responsible for omissions; if the condition is satisﬁed
that the action that was omitted could have been performed by the person we hold
responsible (cf. Fischer and Ravizza 1991).
With regards to omissions, failing to prevent (further) harm can be said to be the
cause of that harm if it is true that but for the omission, the harm would not have
taken place. If it is true that we have a duty to prevent ourselves from causing harm,
then it may also be true that we are not permitted to omit an action if we have the
ability to take that action (Feinberg 1987).
With these requirements in mind, we can see how the onlookers in the case of
Kitty Genovese can be held responsible. Although some of the onlookers may have
misjudged the gravity of the situation, there were at least several who knew that
something bad was going on. The action that was required in this situation was to
call the police, an action not likely to be harmful to the onlooker. Also, it was a very
simple action: all they had to do was dial ‘‘0’’ for operator and ask for the police. It
would have been a different situation if their only way of intervening would have
been to physically come between Kitty and her attacker, because that would
certainly have been dangerous to them.
Now that we have a clearer view on how the onlookers in the case of Kitty
Genovese can be held responsible, I will investigate whether the same can be said of
onlookers in online situations. Internet mediation may have a direct effect on the
measure of responsibility people have but the effects may also be more subtle. For
instance, what if the propensity to be irresponsible or to refrain from acting
responsibly is similar to a genetic predisposition to alcohol dependency? As long as
you are not in a context where you are confronted with alcoholic beverages, you will
not run the risk of becoming an alcoholic. However, if you are in a situation where
you are likely to consume alcoholic beverages then, due to your genetic disposition,
you are quite likely to become an alcoholic. Suppose that exposure to responsibility
undermining situations works in a similar vein, then it might well be that in an
ofﬂine situation, you would be a responsible person, but due to the exposure to
situations that undermine your sense of responsibility online, you are not when
13 This does not necessarily imply that a person cannot be held responsible if he was not able to do
otherwise (cf. Frankfurt counterexamples, Frankfurt 1969).
14 Consequentialist theorists may differ on this in some particular conditions.
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15 I believe this is something that needs to be empirically researched before
we can make any meaningful philosophical deductions.
Factors that are candidates for being of inﬂuence on responsibility are discussed
in the next section.
Differences Between the Online and Ofﬂine Situations
The aim of this section is to identify factors that are of moral relevance when the
online and ofﬂine situations are compared. The investigation will be restricted to a
number of salient differences that are likely to be related to the internet mediation. It
is likely that other factors can be identiﬁed, but if the factors discussed here alone
can be demonstrated to be morally relevant and related to online responsibility, then
it can be concluded that internet mediation does indeed affect responsibility.
The ﬁve candidates discussed are the number of onlookers, the perceived reality
of the situation, the physical distance, the ability of the onlookers to act and
anonymity. After individual appraisal of those factors, I will look at how those
factors are connected, since it will become clear that it is difﬁcult to look at them in
isolation.
The Number of Onlookers
When one is the sole observer of harm in progress and has the ability to do
something about it without unreasonable expense to life and limb, then we
intuitively feel that we are morally obliged to do what we can in order to avoid
further harm. Things get complicated when there are more people who all seem
equally capable of doing something, because as the number of onlookers increases,
the chances that someone will actually take action decreases signiﬁcantly (Latanee ´
and Rodin 1969; Zimbardo 1969), a phenomenon that is now known as the
bystander effect.
Although there is a signiﬁcantly reduced chance of people taking relevant action
in a hazardous situation when they are part of a crowd, that does not seem to morally
excuse them for not doing something when they could have taken action. It might
even be argued that the onlooker is actually more responsible with every additional
onlooker, simply because the chances of someone taking action decrease with the
increase of the number of onlookers. Then again, this somehow feels unjust to the
unsuspecting witness to a harmful situation: it is not his fault that the situation he
inadvertently witnesses
16 happens to have multiple witnesses and it seems rather
unfair that this could land him with more responsibility. On the other hand, if an
15 It can be argued that the potential alcoholic is responsible for not exposing him or herself to situations
in which the trait can manifest. The consequence then is that people might also be held responsible for
getting themselves in a position where they will be less responsible people. .
16 I am for the moment assuming that people do not intentionally want to be witness to harmful
situations. This is contrary to the situation in the movie ‘‘Untraceable’’ (Hoblit 2008), where a killer puts a
victim in front of a webcam and has more lethal harm administered to the victim with the increase of the
numbers of concurrent viewers: people seemed to ﬂock to the images being broadcast.
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least considering taking action (including the assessment of what can be done
without unreasonable harm to that agent), which may also seem unfair because the
agent being a witness is fortuitous: he might equally well not have become a
witness. There is an inherent unfairness in stumbling upon such a situation: when it
happens, responsibility is instantly thrust upon you. In this light it seems that there is
no moral relevance to the number of onlookers in a case in which there was an
option to take action without unreasonable risk: whether there is only one or there
are a thousand, each individual onlooker has a moral obligation to take action when
they can.
Yet intuitively, it appears that people are more offended by cases of preventable
harm in which there are many passive onlookers than where there are a few. This is
probably explained by the fact that with the increased number of onlookers, there is
also an increased probability of the ability of one of those onlookers to intervene.
Take for instance Singer’s famous example of the child who is drowning in a pond
(Singer 1972). If you, as a witness, are unable to swim, the child will drown.
17 With
every additional witness, the chance that someone is able to swim increases, and
then the intuition is that therefore, the chance of the child being rescued is increased.
But rather than thinking that no one was able to swim in a large crowd that is
watching a child drown, it is assumed that many actually could swim but did not use
that ability to rescue the child. This makes all the difference in how we feel about it.
Considering that people had a duty to help in the ﬁrst place, this argument does not
make a moral difference, though; it just introduces the possibility that some of the
onlookers might not have been able to help, increasing the contrast with those who
could have and should have helped; again this has nothing to do with their numbers
per se.
Is there, then, a morally relevant difference in the number of onlookers online
and ofﬂine? There does seem to be a difference in how easy or likely it is to achieve
a large number of onlookers online, which may have a certain moral relevance.
On the internet it appears to be much easier to gather a crowd. It involves no
physical movement of the onlooker; they remain in the same place, from wherever
they are accessing the internet. That makes it much easier to accidentally stumble
upon places you would not normally physically go (e.g. it is easy to inadvertently
land on pornography websites, whereas I wouldn’t be prone to visit a pornography
shop in the ﬂesh). It is indeed as simple as just clicking a link that you get presented
with somewhere.
In the case of Abraham Biggs, there were 1,500 onlookers
18 and in the original
case of Kitty Genovese there were 39. One of the reasons that people became
onlookers in the case of Abraham Biggs was that there was an active thread in the
forum with the link to the images on Justin.tv, which people clicked on. It might
also have been the case that the images of Biggs attracted so many viewers
17 It must be noted that this is not the point Singer wanted to make with his example.
18 Note that the number of 1,500 is most likely to have been the count of the total number of views, not the
number of concurrent viewers. The camera was running for over twelve hours and it is therefore likely that
the number of concurrent onlookers at a given time was a lot lower than 1,500. It is not possible to ﬁnd out
how many people were watching at the same time at some point, because those data have been destroyed.
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‘‘most popular right now’’ category on Justin.tv, which might have enticed random
visitors to click the link to his broadcast.
As easy as people can get to a site on the internet, though, it is equally easy to
move away from it again. So people who clicked the link might have been bored
with the scene within seconds or less (because apart from the start and end of the
broadcast, all that could be seen was a man lying on a bed with his back to the
camera). So even though it is easier to gather a crowd online, the crowd is also much
more easily dispersed.
Now suppose that we take the online Genovese case and suppose that someone
witnessing the attack had posted the link on a popular forum with a relevant
comment about something alarming seeming to be happening there. That might well
have raised the number of the spectators spectacularly, but also, when people
clicked and viewed the moment in between the attacks, they might very well have
clicked away again and not have seen anything, yet they still would have been listed
as a viewer in the stretch of time of the attack. This is however merely relevant to
the type of onlookers: on the internet there is a category of onlooker that can be
counted as such (they were on the particular site at the time), but who are totally
oblivious as to even having been an onlooker as such, because they never realised
that there was something going on that made them responsible to act and who had
left before that fact could permeate. I think it is quite possible that this category
exists in ofﬂine situations too, but due to the fact that it is generally more
cumbersome to move oneself physically away from a scene than to click away from
a webpage, this might just give an agent the chance to realise that he does have a
duty to either ﬁgure out more about the situation or to take action.
19 It thus seems
not unlikely that the proportion of this type of onlookers is a lot smaller in the
ofﬂine situation than in the online situation.
It may thus turn out that the number of onlookers is not morally relevant, but
there still is an aspect of the number of onlookers that might be so, and that is that
the perception of being one of a large number of onlookers. To perceive that you are
part of a large crowd might have a psychological effect that changes behaviour in
such a way that it becomes morally relevant.
As mentioned before, it is clear that when you are the only observer, the
responsibility to take action, or at least contemplate the kind of action needed to
intervene, is all yours. So if there is a difference in the situation with the people—on
the one hand, in the ofﬂine situation in Kew Gardens seeing Kitty being stabbed or,
on the other hand, online on Justin.tv seeing Abraham becoming comatose—the
case might be upheld that the internet makes a difference. In both cases, though, the
onlookers were aware that there were other people witnessing what was going on.
The online Genovese case does not help here, because there—although people could
not know that others were watching—it obviously is not a feature of the internet per
se, since in Abraham’s case, the people were aware that others were seeing what
19 A possible exception is when people are for instance in public transport and get a quick glimpse of a
harmful situation but are carried off before they could get a good view of the matter (e.g. seeing
something from a passing train).
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regarding the internet when it comes to the number of spectators, whether the
spectators knew there were other spectators or not.
20 There does appear to be a
difference in the kind of spectators, but it is undetermined yet whether that has
moral relevance. What determines the kind of spectator has nothing to do with the
number of them, though: it has more to do with how an agent perceives the
situation. This concept will be discussed in the next section.
The Perceived Reality of the Situation
The fact that people speak of ‘‘real life’’ as opposed to what they are doing on the
internet indicates an important feature of how online reality is perceived, namely
that there appears to be something less real about it. In order to elucidate this, let us
look at the original Kitty Genovese case again. When the people in Kew Gardens
heard screaming outside, there was no doubt that there was someone on the street
who was screaming. They knew where the scream was coming from and they could
look out the window and see a woman on the street apparently being attacked. Of
course, Kitty and her attacker could have been accomplices who acted as if he was
attacking her, maybe for some psychology experiment to see whether and how
quickly people would try to intervene or maybe even to lure some unsuspecting
neighbour out in order to mug and rob them.
21 This was however an unlikely
scenario. The woman might have screamed without being in actual danger, like one
neighbour surmised that ‘‘it was a lovers’ quarrel’’.
Compared to the online Kitty Genovese case, there is a different kind of knowing
where the attack took place. The people watching the cam were aware, or could
easily be aware that the attack took place in a particular park, because the website
would state that the views they are broadcasting are from a camera that is located in
that particular park. They could also see that there appeared to be a person being
attacked. There is a different level of certainty about the situation, though, that is
somewhat related to the distinction of knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge
by reference. The mediated way in which the images on the internet are perceived
could be said to be not ‘‘ﬁrst hand’’ experience, but more as having come to you
through a third party; as if you were informed about the situation, but not acquainted
with the situation through your own senses and from your own perspective. There is
much discussion about how certain one can be about observations (cf. Stanley
2008), and about how far you can be certain of sense data at all. For the purpose of
this paper I will just stay with the intuitive notion that we are more certain about the
observations we make with our own senses, without technological mediation.
22
Something we can be quite sure of is that it is much easier to fake images on the
internet than it is in the ofﬂine three dimensional world. What is presented as live
20 It is this aspect that makes the difference. If people believe (whether rightly or wrongly) that there are
other spectators, this lowers the chance of them taking action (Darley and Latane ´ 1968).
21 I thank Nicole A Vincent for bringing this latter motive to my attention.
22 Although spectacles and windows can be said to be technological inventions, these are not what I am
referring to here. I mean for things to be physically in sight and the images not being provided with by
other media.
Online Responsibility 131
123images could very well be a recording, and manipulation of the presented images is
easier on the internet too. This kind of deception is a lot harder in an ofﬂine
situation: compare for instance ‘‘photoshopping’’
23 to sleight of hand tricks; the
latter takes a lot more skill and practice, whereas ‘‘photoshopping’’ is made very
easy by the software.
The two elements of uncertainty regarding images on the internet are that (a) it is
not clear that what you see is the same as what you would see when you were there
(i.e. they might be manipulated in various ways) and (b) it is not clear that the
images you see are happening in real time. This makes it harder to assign
responsibility, for if you cannot be certain something is happening, surely it cannot
be the case that you are required to do something about it, or at least to consider
doing something about it: it does not satisfy the requirements of the epistemic
condition which was mentioned earlier.
In the case of Abraham Biggs, there was quite some discussion about whether the
images were fake or whether the images were on a loop (that is, one stretch of ﬁlm
that is edited in such a way so that it plays over and over though it seems it is
ongoing). However, when considering the online version of the Kitty Genovese
case, the likelihood of the images being fake or tampered with is considerably
smaller. Websites hosting camera broadcasts of a stretch of scenery generally have
the motive to enable people to see that scenery, it is a feature to draw visitors to the
website or to keep them there a bit longer. It does not seem very likely that the
owner of such a website would set up a prank to deceive people into believing they
are witnessing harm in progress.
24 With Abraham, that was not inconceivable,
because in the context of the ‘‘misc’’ section of the forum, pranks are not
uncommon. The video feed from Abraham’s cam and the one in the online Kitty
case would differ in that in the former, nothing much appeared to be happening.
That might have added to the uncertainty about what it was that was going on.
When presented with uncertainty about a situation, are there ways to disambig-
uate what is taking place? People are confronted with ambiguous situations all the
time and certainly there are heuristics with which we generally make sense of what
is happening around us. Among the ﬁrst things we appeal to is perceived
probability: if an event is unlikely to occur, we will tend not to take what is
occurring at face value. Take for instance the crowd waiting for the emperor and his
new clothes. When the emperor with his invisible new clothes appeared, there was a
long silence until one child pointed out that the emperor was naked and then
everyone started to laugh. The emperor had no clothes on for the entire time, but the
notion that the emperor would appear before the crowd naked is so incredible that it
would take a while to sink in.
25 This example points to a second way in which we
23 ‘‘Photoshopping’’ is the act of digitally editing photographic or ﬁlmic images in order to create
illusions or deceptions (the verb is derived from photo editing software from Adobe
 ).
24 Some websites owners would do almost anything to draw visitors, including trying to fool people into
believing they are witnessing harm in progress, but I think it is then likely to be generally known that the
offered images are meant to fool.
25 If something like this took place in a nudist community, there would not have been an ambiguous
situation; the emperor would obviously be expected to be without clothes. The context of a situation
dictates much of what is likely to happen and therefore what can and will be believed to be happening.
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reaction is. It is a strategy of social conﬁrmation. The people staring at the naked
emperor would have looked at each other to see whether others perceived something
out of order. In case of an emergency this might even be stronger. Suppose for
instance that at a crowded market there was a loud noise and shouting. When you
yourself cannot make out what is happening and there are people hurrying back
from where the noise originated with alarmed faces, you will interpret the situation
as dangerous and will want to move away from the commotion too. On the other
hand, if you just see people look and shrug and walk on as normal, you are not likely
to be alarmed.
In the ofﬂine Kitty case, it was difﬁcult for the spectators to see what other
people were doing, since people were in their houses.
26 In a similar vein, the people
who witnessed the assault on the webcam in the online Kitty case had no way to see
each other. However, in the online case, the witnesses could have alerted other
online users and told them to go and watch the cam and say what they thought about
it. Even though the crime took place at three in the morning, that does not
necessarily mean that it was also three in the morning where the viewer was located.
Furthermore, it is quite possible that there are contacts online if the person is in the
habit of being online at that time. The difference between online contacts and the
neighbours in Kew Garden is that you generally are acquainted rather well with your
online contacts, and you are aware that they are awake (because they are online). In
order to have a chat with the neighbours to clarify the situation, it would mean
physically disturbing a person you are not acquainted with in the middle of the
night, without being sure he is even awake. In the online case it is therefore
probably easier to apply this social conﬁrmation strategy.
In the Biggs case, where people were in a situation where they could interact—
using the chat feature next to the camera images,—this strategy went completely
awry, because the general consensus appeared to be that the situation was not
alarming.
But is this really different from ofﬂine situations? There are common examples
of such cases, for instance when a homeless person is seen lying unmoving on the
street, and everyone just steps around him and pays no attention. It is easy to
conclude that the homeless person is just inebriated and will be ﬁne. This might be
very wrong, but that says more about the inappropriateness of the strategy than
about the role of the internet.
Physical Distance
Another candidate for morally relevant difference is proximity. Can it be that it was
of moral relevance that people were physically near?
The view that the people on Justin.tv had of the room of Abraham Biggs gave
them no information about where in the world that room was. It is one of the
interesting features of the internet that geographical distance becomes quite
26 Although it is possible they saw lights on in other houses and heard the neighbour shouting for the
attacker to let the girl alone.
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the other end of the world. Although people online generally tend to be curious with
regard to the whereabouts of the people they interact with, this interaction does not
take place anywhere in particular. Even though technically, there is a physical
location where the database of, for instance, the bodybuilding forum is stored, the
forum in itself is not anywhere in the world in particular. Anyone on the forum
could be anywhere in the world where there is internet access. This curious state of
‘‘nowhereness’’ is interesting with regard to ﬁndings about people’s willingness to
help victims; because the distance one is removed from a person in need makes a
difference. For instance, when Milgram (1963) conducted his shocking obedience
experiments,
27 one of the independent variables he used was the distance of the
subject to the suffering learner. It turned out that distance had a signiﬁcant effect on
the willingness of subjects to administer electrical shocks and he surmised that
‘‘distance, time and physical barriers neutralize the moral sense’’ (Milgram 1974,
p. 157). That is to say, the further people were physically removed from the
suffering person, the more likely it was that they would continue administering
shocks of increasing voltage.
Singer (1972) and Unger (1996) both argue that distance is not morally relevant,
but their examples typically demonstrate that apparently, people do have a
completely different attitude to suffering in front of their eyes compared to suffering
in a remote place.
28 In that sense, they seem to conﬁrm what Milgram indicated, that
proximity to the subject is of inﬂuence on our attitude; in addition they argue that
there is something morally wrong with this attitude of letting proximity be of
relevance to our judgment.
If we look back at our two real cases and focus on the two people that took
action, that is: the neighbour that called the police in Kitty’s case, and the boy in
India in Abraham’s case, maybe we can learn something from our intuitions about
how much we think they are to be praised for what they did.
29 After all, the
neighbour was physically near and the boy in India deﬁnitely was not. I think that
few people would say that the neighbour was actually to be praised for ﬁnally
calling the police. It is merely that he took the action that all other onlookers failed
to take and in that he stands out from the rest. In that sense he is somewhat excused
27 These were the ‘‘learning’’ experiments (Milgram 1963) where a ‘‘teacher’’ (the subject) had to
administer electrical shocks of increased voltage to a ‘‘learner’’ (an accomplice in the experiment) when
he made errors in a word learning task. The ‘‘learner’’ never actually got the shocks, he just acted as if he
did; the experiment was about seeing how far subjects would go administering shocks to a person in
apparently increasing agony just because the experimenter told him so.
28 Peter Singer’s example of the drowning child in the pond is to demonstrate that if you are obliged to
rescue the child even though it will damage your shoes, then you’re equally obliged to donate the value of
your shoes when that will save the life of a distant needy child. Unger (1996) makes a similar contrast
with saving a child at the expense of your vintage sedan, a trolley case: the child and the sedan are on
different tracks and a train will run over the child unless you pull the switch, in which case your sedan
gets wrecked. Surely you have to sacriﬁce the sedan in order to save the life of the child, and then surely,
when you receive an envelope from an organisation saying that for that same amount of money you can
save the life of a child, you should, too.
29 This question is relevant here because praiseworthiness and blame are closely related to assigning
responsibility (cf. Williams 2003).
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case of the boy in India is quite different; indeed he can be regarded as quite heroic.
Where everyone else was apathetic, he carefully observed the situation, deemed it
alarming and made a considerable effort to obtain the relevant data (namely, ﬁnding
out what Abraham’s location was, which was more than the neighbour had to do)
and report to the police (which was more complicated than what the neighbour had
to do, which was just dial ‘‘0’’ for operator). It was a commendable thing to do, and
it is a pity it was too late. I do not think I am the only one who takes this view. Is it
true, then, that the distance makes the difference: that is to say, did the neighbour,
due to being near, have a greater responsibility than the boy in India? That question
is not easy to answer, because there are other factors that are relevant in the case of
the Indian boy; for instance, the gravity of the situation was less salient in his case
and the fact that it was not so easy to do something about it.
30 So what if we take our
online Kitty case and surmise that the person taking action was an adult person in
India? Unless we construct a bit of an unlikely case—with a person who used to live
near the park and knows what number to call and who recently moved to India and
happened to venture on the site where the images of the webcam are broadcast at the
moment that our hypothetical Kitty was being stabbed—it is not so easy to eliminate
other aspects that differ. Since the online Kitty case is more obvious when it comes
to the gravity of the situation, compared to the case of Abraham, what we are left
with on the one hand, is that it is just more difﬁcult to access the emergency
numbers of the different country (because the local number is still different from the
number one would have to call from abroad).
31 On the other hand, I assume it is
harder to convince the ofﬁcer on the phone that what you are seeing is an
emergency, since you are nowhere near the event but viewing things on a webcam
(as the boy in India discovered). However, if this is what the aspect of distance
might be reduced to, it is not the distance per se that is relevant: it is the perceived
reality of the situation—which I already covered—and the ability to act, which I
will cover next.
The Ability to Act
If a certain situation called for a certain action but you, as an agent, were in no way
able to take that action, it seems fair to say that you cannot be responsible for not
doing so.
32 If we walk by the pond and see the child drowning but we cannot swim,
there is no obligation for us to jump in the pond and try to save the child. We ought
to look at the alternatives though. If we can attract the attention of someone else or
call the police, we may have a responsibility to do that: in being confronted with the
30 It must be noted as well that the boy in India was 17 and adolescents are not commonly held
responsible in the same way adults are held responsible: this is reﬂected in the law, where there is
different jurisdiction for juveniles. The rationale is that children lack the mental capacities to be fully
responsible.
31 Dialling 911 in India does not get you the emergency line in the US. It is not that easy to ﬁnd which
emergency number to dial if the emergency is taking place in a different country.
32 This is derived from Kant’s principle that ‘‘ought’’ implies ‘‘can’’ (cf. Guyer 2004). There is much
debate about this principle and some of the difﬁculties are addressed in this paper. .
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can to ameliorate the situation for the drowning child. If there is no one nearby, and
you do not carry a phone, then you cannot be responsible for not calling or drawing
the attention of another person. If on the other hand, you do carry a phone, but
decide that you do not want to be involved and you toss the phone into the pond,
then indeed: you cannot make the call, but you are still responsible. The point there
is that you deliberately put yourself into a position where you were unable to do
what was needed.
33
In the case of Kitty Genovese, the onlooking neighbours, when considering their
options may have concluded they were indeed not required to come between Kitty
and her attacker, since that would put them in considerable danger. That did not
exclude them from the duty to consider what other options they had though, and the
most obvious thing to do was to call the police, which would have been very simple
(they had phones
34 and they only had to dial ‘‘0’’). In this sense they were fully
responsible for their omission to call the police.
In Abraham’s case it was more complicated, because it was not clear where he
was exactly; his proﬁle only stated that he was in Florida. There are good reasons
not to post your address details on the internet for everyone to ﬁnd and Abraham had
not done so. It could very well be that the onlookers in Abraham’s case, who
realised the gravity of the situation and thought that something ought to be done,
perceived that they were in fact powerless to do anything, since to ﬁnd Abraham’s
room would surely be like ﬁnding a needle in a hay stack and it would be pointless
to burden the police with that.
This is different in the online Kitty case, because onlookers there were aware of
the exact location of the attack. Their difﬁculty would be to ﬁnd the correct number
to make the phone call and then to see to it that they effectively communicated to the
police that there was an emergency going on. It must be noted that in none of the
cases it was certain that calling the police would have prevented further harm: the
intervention of the police when they would have appeared to the scene might have
been too late. Perhaps then, it was not as salient for everyone that what they ought to
do was to call the police, but this is true for both online and ofﬂine cases. Considering
this, it seems reasonable to state that in general it is harder to ﬁgure out exactly where
a person in peril is when observed on the net compared to ﬁnding that out when you
see the person with your own eyes or rather, not mediated by a webcam.
35
One thing that needs to be explored in this context, though, concerns the
possibility that people can be responsible despite not being able to take action, due
to their deliberate incapacitation of themselves. There are various ways in which
people may incapacitate themselves, but that does not always necessarily render
33 It is of course also possible that people become paralysed by the situation due to the shocking nature of
the situation. This is obviously not a deliberate incapacitation. So it may be that they in fact did have a
phone but were unable to think of making the call. In those situations people are excused from not making
the call (cf. Fischer and Ravizza 2000, pp. 48–51).
34 Kew Gardens was an afﬂuent neighbourhood at the time and it is most likely that people had
telephones (from personal communication with Joe de May Jr., cf. De May 2004).
35 This is provided that you yourself know where you are, which is not especially relevant in online
situations.
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the pond again, and consider you can swim in normal circumstances, but you are on
your way home from celebrating with friends in the pub and you are inebriated to
such extent that you are unable to swim and therefore are unable to save the child. I
think most people would agree that this is just tough luck; it would be unreasonable
to have to stay in an optimal condition all the time just in the odd case that someone
should need your help. One could argue that that is in fact a very good reason to ban
alcoholic beverages, but it would also mean having to be ﬁt and alert at all times and
then it becomes unreasonable; people do get tired and need sleep. The situation
changes when your particular role demands of you that you refrain from
incapacitating yourself. For instance, if you are the minder of the child, it is
obviously wrong that you got inebriated and failed in your responsibility of taking
care of the child. In the same vein, an ofﬁcer on watch can be held responsible for
falling asleep whereas in itself, there is nothing morally wrong about falling asleep
(cf. example ‘‘Caught Off Guard’’ in Sher 2009).
Itissheercoincidencethatthemanwhoeventuallycalledthepolicetoalertthemto
the situation of Kitty Genovese appears to have been heavily drinking that night.
Maybe if he had not been drinking, he would have been better able to assess the
situation and maybe Kitty would have survived the attack. However, considering that
hewasintheprivacyofhisownhomeanddidnothavearoleoftakingcareofanyone,
I doubt we can reproach him for having been inebriated at that particular time; it was
not likely that he would have been called upon to take responsibility for anything.
Considering that very often, people who dwell on the internet in the recreational
setting of, for instance, the ‘‘misc’’ section of the body building forum, are in the
privacy of their own homes, it would seem fair to say that therefore, they are free to
incapacitate themselves when they are not in a particular role where they are
required to have full control over their faculties. Of course, this is only addressing
the issue where they would be incapacitated due to personal circumstances rather
than circumstances in general that are related to the internet. There may however, be
another case of deliberately incapacitating oneself by engaging in a community
where it is, seemingly due to the nature of the medium, impossible to be a
responsible person. That is to say, by engaging in a platform where you know you
are unable to interfere in the case of an emergency, you may still be responsible,
because you will have voluntarily incapacitated yourself. This would, however, be
similar to the case of the inebriated passerby to the pond with the drowning child,
since in neither case the subject would have a role in which they ought to make sure
they did not incapacitate themselves.
All in all, the internet does seem to have a general hampering effect on the ability
of people to take action in case of an emergency, and this is partly due to the fact
that often essential information, such as the location of a person in peril online,
cannot be pinpointed due to the fact that they are there under a pseudonym. This
brings me to the next section, where I investigate the role of anonymity.
36
36 Although anonymity does not seem to present a problem prima facie for responsibility, in the context
of the internet it is a much cited concept with regards to moral matters (cf. Johnson 2004) which is why it
is included.
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It is generally recommended that one be careful about supplying information on the
internet that could identify you, for reasons of, for instance, the risk of identity theft
and—particularly for children—the risk of being targeted by online predators. A
less ominous reason to not be identiﬁable online is to protect one’s privacy. Forums
generally can be read by everyone online and it is not always desirable that
utterances in one context spill over in another; for instance, you might discuss a
health issue you have on a health forum but you would not want your employer to
read your posts; not because you want to deceive your employer, but simply because
the information is private.
37
It is not surprising, then, that Abraham was on the body building forum under a
pseudonym, as are most other users. This anonymity provides for lower risk of the
abovementioned dangers, but it also has an effect on how people interact with each
other. Zimbardo (1969) deﬁned the effect of anonymity on behaviour as
deindividuation: when anonymous,
38 people tend to be less self aware, engage
less in self-evaluation and are less concerned about social comparison and
evaluation. This theory has been revised for computer mediated communication in a
Social Identity model of Deindividuation Effects (Christopherson 2007), the
discussion of which is outside the scope of this paper. The key point is that
anonymity does affect behaviour in positive and negative ways; that is, it affects
what actions people take and which actions they refrain from taking. When they are
anonymous in computer mediated communication, such as in chat rooms and
forums, people generally are less inhibited concerning the use of expletives and
strong language. People may also experience a dissociation of their online
pseudonyms from their ofﬂine selves which makes them feel less accountable for
inappropriate online social behaviour (Suler 2004). A combination of these effects
may be seen in relation to Abraham’s suicide: the callous egging on and the apathy
with regard to trying to intervene. However, this situation is not unique to online
situations: the phenomenon of a crowd baiting a person who is about to commit
suicide by jumping off a building is rare yet recurring (Mann 1981).
When we compare the online and ofﬂine Kitty cases, the onlookers’ measure of
anonymity stands out. The neighbours in Kew Garden may not have known who the
woman was who was being attacked, but since the location was known and they had
a view of that location, it was not very difﬁcult to identify who might have
witnessed the event. In fact, this was what the journalist who reported the case in the
New York Times did: those neighbours were then put in the uncomfortable position
of having to answer why they had not called the police. In contrast, the onlookers in
the online case felt themselves completely unobserved and unidentiﬁable: there was
no indication they were being registered (there was no counter of concurrent
viewers) and they had not been required to log in. If not for the log of the website,
they could have left the scene without a trace. This sense of invisibility would have
37 Also, it is this kind of information that internet trolls may target (cf. Schwartz 2008).
38 Zimbardo (1969) deﬁned anonymity as ‘‘the inability of others to identify or single out an individual
such that the individual cannot be evaluated, criticized, judged or punished’’ (Christopherson 2007).
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real case where the chances of being detected would have been perceived as much
larger, the result might have been no one taking any action at all. Thus anonymity
does affect moral behaviour, but it does not render people less responsible. This is
similar to how the number of onlookers reducing the chances of someone helping
does not make the individual onlookers less responsible for acting: although there is
a change in moral behaviour due to this factor, there is no moral justiﬁcation for this
change in behaviour.
Given that Zimbardo developed a theory concerning people shirking responsi-
bility through anonymity in the late 1960s, the phenomenon is clearly not uniquely
related to the internet. It is, however, not only a lot easier to be anonymous on the
internet, it is essentially recommended.
The Combination of the Factors
When observed independently, it seems that only the perceived reality of the
situation and the ability to act have moral relevance when it comes to the
responsibility of the onlookers.
Two things can be said about the combination of the factors, though. First, there
is the possibility that factors that may not seem signiﬁcant may become
synergistically signiﬁcant when grouped together. It may be possible that although
in isolation the effects on our responsibility would not reach a threshold where we
would say they are signiﬁcant, taken together they will. If that is true, then internet
mediation, due to its inherent accumulation of these factors, makes us less
responsible.
Second, the factors are not as distinct as they seemed at ﬁrst sight: when
examining them, it turned out that they are very closely connected with each other.
For instance, the number of onlookers may be helpful in determining the reality of
the situation, but it might also be detrimental to it due to a failure in the strategy of
social conﬁrmation. Awareness of being in a crowd fosters a sense of anonymity of
the onlooker. Physical nearness could very well only be relevant due to the fact that
you have a better opportunity to conﬁrm the reality of the situation and have better
opportunities for taking a successful action. Anonymity affects both the perceived
reality of the situation and the ability to act. The ability to act, in turn, depends
heavily on your perception of the reality of the situation and also on your perception
of what your options are, which is inﬂuenced by your proximity to the situation.
Given the interconnectedness of all those factors, then, it is perhaps misleading to
consider these factors in isolation. For instance, even if it is true that the only moral
relevance of physical distance lies in the side effects of affecting the perception of
the reality of the situation and the ability to act, that does not mean that we can
claim that the distance does not matter, because distance will always affect
perception and ability to act.
As we have seen, taken in isolation, none of the factors discussed are unique to
internet mediation. It is well possible that the combination of those factors is not
unique either. However, the situations in which you may encounter those factors in
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situations: internet mediation is exemplary for those factors.
Conclusion
Does internet mediation make a difference to the extent to which we have a
responsibility to take action in a potentially harmful situation? In order to answer
that question I contrasted the cases of Kitty Genovese and Abraham Biggs. I
examined various salient potentially morally relevant differences between ofﬂine
and online emergency situations: the number of onlookers, the perceived reality of
the situation, the physical distance, the ability to act and anonymity. With each of
these factors, there are two germane subsequent questions that relate to the moral
relevance of the factor to online responsibility: (a) whether the factor indeed has
moral relevance when it comes to responsibility and (b) whether the factor is unique
to internet mediation. The number of onlookers, the physical nearness and
anonymity of the onlookers in and of themselves seem to have no moral relevance
when it comes to the responsibility of those onlookers to take action: they do not
directly affect any of the circumstances in which we can hold people responsible.
The perceived reality of the situation and the ability to act do affect those
circumstances: in order to take responsibility, you have to be aware that the situation
is such that it requires you to take action and you have to be able to take action.
However, none of those factors are unique to internet mediation. The reason that
there still seem grounds to conclude that internet mediation does inﬂuence moral
responsibility of onlookers lies in the combination of those factors. It is inherent to
internet mediation that one is subjected to all those factors when online and
although none of these factors is particularly novel, the fact that they are so
inextricably connected to internet mediation makes a difference. Note that this
assessment of online responsibility is relative rather than absolute: there appears to
be a lessening effect in online situations as compared to ofﬂine situations.
For this reason, future studies should investigate what can be done about
designing interfaces in such a way that the same level of responsibility we
experience ofﬂine can be maintained in the course of online interactions as well.
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